The peaceful atom comes to campus by Martin, Joe
Reflecting on how university research could meet the challeng-
es of the early 1950s, University of Michigan Provost James P. 
Adams suggested that future historians would consider the 
heady post–World War II years to be “an age of invincible 
surmise.”2 He regarded the era with an optimistic eye. More 
so than at any point in history, Adams maintained, troves 
of useful knowledge lay within human grasp; as American 
society sought to turn that knowledge to its advantage, uni-
versities held “a special responsibility for the guardianship of 
truth.” In the postwar years, the University of Michigan dis-
charged that responsibility through a homegrown program 
exploring peaceful uses of nuclear science: the Michigan Me-
morial–Phoenix Project. Alongside notable research accom-
plishments, the Phoenix Project sparked systematic chang-
es in the way Michigan supported research and reformed 
its relationships with its alumni community and industry.
The “Atoms for Peace” initiative in the United States was 
most closely tied to the civilian nuclear power program that 
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) maintained within 
the national laboratory system. Historians tend to under-
stand the phrase, drawn from a speech President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower delivered before the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1953, as a kind of Cold War doublespeak. Yes, 
research on civilian nuclear technologies was a peacetime ap-
plication of nuclear physics, but the goals of the AEC and 
its national laboratories were inextricable from the strategic 
and ideological conflict with the Soviet Union.3 In the same 
era, however, American universities launched their own lo-
cal efforts to find new uses for wartime science. Stanford 
and MIT recognized new government and industry interest 
in funding academia as a route to national prominence and 
launched research programs to capitalize.4 The University 
of Chicago established its Institutes for Basic Research to 
maintain the programs and staff of the wartime Metallur-
gical Laboratory.5 And at the University of Michigan, the 
atom came to campus in the form of a war memorial. This 
last case offers a striking contrast to the story of civilian 
nuclear research as seen from the perspective of the AEC, 
and shows how the pursuit of the peaceful atom reformed 
patterns of support for scientific research at Michigan.
Phoenix Rising: Idealism and Ambition
The Michigan Memorial–Phoenix Project started small. Its 
first crumpled dollars came from a raffle held at the J-Hop, 
the annual student formal, in December of 1946. The raf-
fle, organized by the student legislature, raised funds for 
a war memorial. Operation Phoenix, as it was sometimes 
called, was the result. Its mission was both to commemo-
rate the University of Michigan students and alumni who 
had died in World War II, and, as its logo depicting the 
rising Phoenix bird illustrated, to refocus the destructive 
power unleashed in the war to constructive ends (Figure 1). 
The project launched in 1948 in the midst of a massive fund-
raising campaign, the first in the university’s history that 
sought support from the entire alumni base. Phoenix offered 
grants to a wide array of faculty-led projects dealing with 
peaceful uses of atomic and nuclear science. By 1960, when 
Donald Glaser won the Nobel Prize for his Phoenix-funded 
work on the bubble chamber, the project had raised over $10 
million. But at the dawn of 1947, it was little more than a 
twinkle in the eyes of a few sincere students who surmised 
that they might do a small part to craft a better postwar world.
The students who organized the campaign were not content 
to build a monument; they insisted upon a living, function-
al memorial. University administrators embraced this plan, 
OPERATION PHOENIX:
The Peaceful Atom Comes to Campus
Columbus found a world, and had no chart,
Save one that faith deciphered in the skies;
To trust the soul’s invincible surmise
Was all his science and his only art.
— George Santayana1 
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but the exact function the memorial should accomplish was 
not immediately clear. Early ideas generated within the plan-
ning committee ranged from the modest—a permanent light 
in a quiet corner of the library—to the grand and idealistic—
an international program to prevent war. The task of solic-
iting further suggestions fell to the dean of students, Erich 
A. Walter. He cast a wide net, beginning with a survey of 
memorial plans at other colleges and universities across the 
country. Oberlin and Stanford had established scholarships 
to pay tuition for children of alumni or students who had 
died in the war. The University of Texas and Princeton had 
proposed more general scholarship programs. New library 
buildings, student unions, auditoria, and chapels were in the 
works at Swarthmore, Indiana, Dartmouth, and Michigan 
State. The committee, however, fueled by the students’ insis-
tence on a distinctive function for the Michigan memorial, 
was hesitant to follow the precedent these institutions set.
In a stark indication of the breath of possibility the memo-
rial fund represented, and of the sense that the university 
was navigating unmapped territory, Walter wrote to public 
figures around the world to solicit their input. These in-
cluded American literary stars such as John Hersey, military 
giants like Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and international 
political icons including Winston Churchill and Madame 
Chiang Kai-Shek. Walter’s letter emphasized the desire for 
a functional memorial, gave as an example one veteran’s 
suggestion of an enduring light a prominent point on cam-
pus, and asked advice on how best to proceed. Among those 
who replied were Lewis Mumford, who pitched a fellowship 
to allow students to broaden their horizons by traveling to 
non-Western countries. E. B. White, reasoning that a war 
memorial should bolster the institutions of peace, imagined 
a fund to send students to sessions of the United Nations. 
Others had more utilitarian visions. Orson Wells suggested 
a dormitory that would alleviate housing shortages for veter-
ans and their families. Popular songster Fred Waring riffed 
on the suggestion that the memorial be a light of some kind 
to propose that the light be affixed to the top of a broadcast 
tower, possibly for a radio station with the call letters HERO.
The idea that became the seed of the Phoenix Project, how-
ever, came not from a famous writer, warrior, or warbler, 
but from an alumnus. Walter issued a similar request for in-
put to Michigan alumni, and Frederick Smith, an executive 
with the New York–based Book of the Month Club, replied 
in October of 1947: “I think it is wrong to try to think of 
things to do, or gadgets to build, to perpetuate the memory 
of a lot of men who are far more interested in making their 
work and their sacrifices count for something, than they are 
in being remembered…. It is my feeling that the University 
might take unto itself the administration and coordination 
of research in some specific phase of peacetime atomic re-
search.” Smith recalled how he had bristled at the suggestion 
by Frédéric Joliot-Curie, France’s High Commissioner for 
Atomic Energy and an outspoken communist, that the Unit-
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Figure 1. The Michigan Memorial–Phoenix Project logo: an early concept from 1948, likely drawn by one of the students on the memorial planning 
committee (left), and the official logo as adopted in the 1950s (right). (Phoenix Project Records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.)
ed States, having unleashed nuclear weapons on the world, 
was shirking its duty to turn nuclear physics to the purposes 
of peace. After talking with his contacts in the AEC and in 
the medical community, however, Smith had grudgingly con-
cluded that Joliot-Curie had a point. When Walter’s letter 
landed on his desk, he saw an opportunity for his alma mater 
to help right what he percieved as an embarrassing wrong.
Consensus rapidly crystalized around Smith’s suggestion. 
It flattered the students’ idealistic motives and resonat-
ed with the administration’s ambitions. In the 1920s and 
1930s, the Michigan Summer Research Institute in Theo-
retical Physics—affectionately known as the “Michigan Sum-
mer School” in physics circles—routinely hosted Europe-
an luminaries such as Niels Bohr, Paul Ehrenfest, Enrico 
Fermi, Werner Heisenberg, and Hendrik Kramers. These 
symposia were critical to the dissemination of quantum 
mechanics in the United States.6 Michigan sought to re-
capture that momentum, which the war disrupted, and 
nuclear research loomed large as an area that would dom-
inate physics for decades. Dedicating a memorial research 
program to peaceful uses of the atom therefore spoke to 
the fresh-faced idealism of the memorial proposal while 
also supporting the university’s ambition to maintain 
and advance its status as a premier research institution.
Smith remained involved in the program’s early planning. 
He sketched a design for a memorial rotunda at the entrance 
to the Phoenix laboratory (Figure 2), which, though never 
adopted, illustrates the close connection the project sought 
between its research and memorial missions. It was also 
Smith who proposed that the program be named after the 
Phoenix, suggesting that the image of the mythical bird ris-
ing from the ashes best illustrated the goal of reclaiming the 
atomic nucleus from the forces of war and putting it to work 
on behalf of scientific, medical, technological, and civic prog-
ress. The mythological imagery captured his hope, shared by 
the project’s administrators, that Phoenix would represent 
a new, enlightened age born from the destruction, both 
physical and psychological, wrought by nuclear weapons.
The program dispensed its first awards in November 1948. 
A building soon followed in the new North Campus, a cam-
pus expansion planned by up-and-coming architect Eero 
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Figure 2. Frederick Smith’s sketch of a memorial rotunda, incorporating the idea of a perpetually burning light, to serve as an entrance to the Phoenix 
Project Laboratory. (Phoenix Project Records, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.)
Saarinen.7 Ralph A. Sawyer (Figure 3), a physicist and dean 
of the School of Graduate Studies, became its first direc-
tor. Sawyer boasted a strong nuclear physics résumé. He 
had earned his PhD under R. A. Millikan at the Univer-
sity of Chicago and in 1946 had served as the Navy’s sci-
entific liaison officer for the Operation Crossroads bomb 
tests at Bikini Atoll. Phoenix, however, was a different an-
imal. Under Sawyer’s stewardship, it established a nuclear 
research program that gave military applications a wide 
berth. It also focused on a broad array of small projects, 
rather than on large-scale nuclear infrastructure, making 
it substantively different from the Atoms for Peace pro-
gram that would emerge a few years later within the AEC.8
The Fruits of Phoenix
Phoenix quickly generated notable results. On June 12, 
1952, Donald Glaser (Figure 4) submitted a letter to Physi-
cal Review, in which he acknowledged Phoenix Project sup-
port, describing the principle behind the bubble chamber. 
Glaser had demonstrated the principle on a small scale, 






O) to 130°C in a 
sturdy glass tube and exposing it to radioactive cobalt, con-
ditions in which “liquid in the tube always erupted as soon 
as the pressure was released.”9 This simple demonstration 
presaged the particle detectors that produced some of the 
most iconic images in twentieth-century physics (Figure 5). 
By allowing physicists to visualize previously obscure pro-
cesses, it enabled discoveries that added considerably to a 
growing menagerie of new particles and was instrumental 
in developing the Standard Model of particle physics.10 
The bubble chamber is the best known of the fruits of 
Phoenix, but it was just one of many. One of the most 
enduring was, quite literally, fruit. An early and long-run-
ning Phoenix program investigated the use of radiation 
to sterilize and preserve foodstuffs, including fruits and 
vegetables. The program was a publicity coup, and earned 
a prominent place in subsequent promotional materials. 
Phoenix assistant director Henry Gomberg, along with his 
fellow professor of nuclear engineering Lloyd E. Brownell, 
pursued techniques for irradiating pork to prevent trichino-
sis, a recognized public health threat in the 1950s, meriting 
a notice in The Times of London in 1954. Food irradiation 
grew rapidly during the Cold War, especially as the Unit-
ed Nations began to envision it as a tool to aide the Green 
Revolution of the 1960s and to bring developing countries 
into the modern—atomic—age.11 Radiation-based steriliza-
tion and preservation techniques remain widespread, with 
approximately 100,000 tons of food irradiated in the United 
States annually.12 Another major class of projects explored 
the applications of radioisotopes to medicine, much of it 
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Figure 3. Ralph Sawyer, the first Phoenix Project director, photo-
graphed during the Operation Crossroads nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll 
in the mid-1940s. (Ralph A. Sawyer Papers, Bentley Historical Library, 
University of Michigan.)
Figure 4. Donald Glaser works on his bubble chamber, the develop-
ment of which was funded by the Phoenix Project, in the early 1960s. 
The bubble chamber was recognized with the 1960 Nobel Prize in 
Physics. (© 2010 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.)
cancer research conducted under the auspices of a special 
fund endowed in the name of Alice Crocker Lloyd, Michi-
gan’s long-time dean of women, who died of cancer in 1950. 
But it was the Phoenix Project’s multidisciplinary scope that 
most clearly distinguished it from similar programs at the 
AEC and at other universities. Enlisting a wide array of cam-
pus departments was integral to the Phoenix mission. Sawyer 
informed Michigan’s president Alexander Ruthven in 1949 
that work was already underway to identify projects outside 
the physical sciences: “Professor [Horace M.] Miner in a pre-
liminary survey of local possibilities has described more than 
twenty important projects in law, economics, psychology, 
business administration, and other fields which await finan-
cial support for their initiation.” A handbook for Phoenix 
staff codified the reasoning for framing Phoenix so broadly: 
History tells us that the advent of every new form of energy has re-
sulted in tremendous changes in the social and economic life of each 
human being. In the past, development of new forms of energy con-
cerned mainly with technological perfection, with little regard to so-
cial, political and economic consequences. This left unemployment, 
confusion and much suffering. Social scientists at Michigan hope to 
change history this time by preparing, in advance, for the atomic age.
Phoenix funded numerous projects on the social dimen-
sions of the nuclear age, from law research designed to 
ease legal barriers to civilian uses of nuclear technology to 
studies of radioactivity levels in archaeological materials.
Of all the research Phoenix supported, the bubble chamber 
in many respects epitomizes what the project hoped to accom-
plish. It represented the pure-physics side of nuclear research, 
the tradition that would branch off as high energy physics. 
Many physicists who had been disillusioned by American 
use of nuclear weapons against Japan transitioned into par-
ticle physics as a way to avoid the military interests closing in 
on nuclear research.13 The bubble chamber, a tool to probe 
the arcane and bewildering new particle zoo, reflected both 
the scientific content Phoenix hoped to promote and the 
scientific conscience it endeavored to uphold. In one criti-
cal respect, however, the bubble chamber represents only a 
narrow sliver of the Phoenix Project’s significance. From its 
inception, Phoenix was designed to advance research in the 
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Figure 5. A Fermilab bubble chamber image showing the first direct experimental evidence of a neutrino interaction. (Courtesy of Argonne National 
Laboratory.)
physical sciences, but it was also aggressive in promoting a 
broad range of other activities. These encompassed biolo-
gy, agriculture, forestry, the social sciences, law, and educa-
tion, and ensured that Phoenix was a campus-wide effort.
In its breadth, the Phoenix Project embodied the aspira-
tions of the early postwar era. It was founded on an almost 
naïvely hopeful sense that the world—or at least the coun-
try—was prepared to pull together and leave the destruction 
of World War II behind. The program’s role as a memorial 
helped sustain those lofty ideals. But research cannot run 
on ideals alone. While Phoenix administrators were craft-
ing the program’s image as a conscience-driven approach to 
nuclear age, they were also proceeding with the nitty-grit-
ty of raising the funds needed to get the program running.
A Plea to Alumni; A Challenge to Industry
As the Phoenix Project took shape, its leaders worried that 
the AEC might scupper the effort. Michigan’s administra-
tors were anxious about what they perceived as the govern-
ment’s desire to monopolize nuclear research. Michigan 
Senator Homer Ferguson fueled these concerns during a 
December 1949 meeting with Ruthven and members of the 
Phoenix fundraising committee, suggesting: “the University 
may anticipate jealousy on the part of the AEC as knowl-
edge of the plans to establish an atomic research center be-
comes more widespread. It is well known in Washington 
that the government is anxious to keep all atomic energy 
affairs under government jurisdiction.” Preliminary anxiety 
that the AEC might stonewall the Phoenix proposal proved 
unfounded. On Ferguson’s recommendation, Phoenix elic-
ited endorsements from then-General Eisenhower and War-
ren Austin, the US ambassador to the United Nations, to 
hedge against AEC opposition. By February 1950, follow-
ing visits to campus from AEC scientists and lobbying in 
Washington by Sawyer and other university representatives, 
Phoenix had won the AEC’s endorsement and issued a news 
release reporting that the Commission “applauds the deci-
sion to further knowledge in this new field and the intent 
to explore the beneficial potentialities of atomic energy.”
Phoenix leaders nevertheless consciously elected not to pur-
sue government funding. Their concern that the AEC would 
be jealously possessive of nuclear research reflected a larger 
desire to avoid the control they imagined government dol-
lars might exert over their researchers. Phoenix’s appeals for 
support leaned heavily on the project’s independence from 
government. One fundraising broadsheet boasted that this 
independence meant that Phoenix “does not insist on im-
mediate or practical research results.” A 1950 radio press re-
lease advertised that, within the Phoenix research portfolio, 
“one of the studies to be made deals with the probably effect 
on our way of life if there should be complete government 
control of this vast new power.” The conviction that the 
university was in competition, more so than cooperation, 
with the federal government for jurisdiction over nuclear re-
search persisted, and would shape the program’s evolution.
The desire to insulate the Phoenix Project from govern-
ment influence cut off its most obvious source of fund-
ing. The original proposal called for $6.5 million (about 
$65 million in 2016 dollars), $2 million for the construc-
tion of a building, and $4.5 to support research. With 
government funding ruled out, Michigan turned to its 
alumni and to industry. It would be the university’s first 
systematic development campaign, and the first time it 
had approached its entire alumni base for contributions.
The rhetoric of the campaign was soaring, with expectations 
to match. President Ruthven wrote in a letter soliciting do-
nations from alumni: “The Michigan Memorial–Phoenix 
Project is at once a tribute to the gold star sons and daugh-
ters of Michigan and an all out program for investigating the 
peacetime applications and implications of atomic science. 
We have the opportunity and the ability to make a most 
important contribution to the world. All that we need to get 
going is the financial support of our alumni and friends.” In 
light of these objectives, a guide for fundraisers explained, 
“Every former student of the University of Michigan is ex-
pected to give something.” The expectation was notional, 
rather than practical. When Phoenix launched, Michigan 
had neither centralized data about its alumni nor a perma-
nent development program. Phoenix provided the basis for 
both. By 1952, 29,568 individual donors, the majority of 
them alumni, had pledged a total of over $2.5 million to 
Phoenix, with most regions achieving an alumni giving rate 
of over 20%. When the first Phoenix campaign concluded in 
1953, it had raised over $7 million from combined individu-
al and industry contributions. Michigan’s Alumni Fund was 
established as a permanent fundraising unit the same year.
An extensive and well-coordinated publicity campaign 
complemented Michigan’s appeal to its alumni. The cam-
paign placed news stories about Michigan’s atomic pro-
grams in newspapers nationwide and produced glossy 
mailers and brochures to distribute to visitors and give 
away at fundraising events with titles like “The Race Is 
On” and “The Bountiful Atom.” The project even com-
missioned a Phoenix-themed radio play, a Western set in 
the New Mexico desert, and the 1951 Rose Bowl, in which 
the Michigan Wolverines defeated the California Golden 
Bears, featured a halftime tribute to the Phoenix Project 
by the Michigan band. The attention to publicity reflect-
ed Ruthven’s conviction that the Phoenix program was 
“one of the most important in [the] institution’s history.”
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Phoenix wrought changes no less significant to the univer-
sity’s relationship with industry. A narrow majority of the 
project’s initial funding came from corporations, which 
Michigan courted by emphasizing the role Phoenix could 
play in bolstering free enterprise based on nuclear science. 
The structure of the basic argument to industrial patrons, 
who had not previously made significant contributions to 
Michigan’s research program, was twofold. First, investing 
in university research could be expected to produce a long-
term return on investment in the form of discoveries which 
could form the basis for new technologies. Second, corpo-
rations had an obligation to collaborate with universities 
to preempt a government monopoly on nuclear science.
From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, the most 
notable aspect of this argument is the extent to which Phoe-
nix staff relied on humanitarian justifications in their quest 
for corporate support. They approached General Electric, ex-
plaining: “The University of Michigan is encouraged to sub-
mit this proposal to the General Electric Company for a num-
ber of reasons. Both institutions, in their aims and purposes, 
transcend their basic functions—education on the one hand 
and industry on the other—to serve not only students or cus-
tomers, but humanity at large.” Ideals, as much as pragmatism, 
motivated the case that industry should get behind Phoenix. 
Even in such a sober document as a written proposal to 
GE, Phoenix administrators draped their pitch in idealistic 
rhetoric, quoting “In Flanders Field” in their account of the 
program’s origins: “Far from the conventional monument of 
cold metal or stone, the Phoenix Project will function as a dy-
namic, working, life-serving tribute to our hero dead…. What 
more fitting way is there to answer the challenge of our gold 
star brothers and sisters: ‘To you, from falling hands, we throw 
the torch; be yours to hold it high.’” In contrast to programs 
at MIT and Stanford, where relationships with industry and 
government tended to be based on contract research with 
well-articulated practical aims, Michigan relied on the Phoe-
nix Project’s war memorial status to access support that fell 
between direct contracting and philanthropy. The program’s 
leaders sought to limit reliance on contract research, but also 
to avoid the caps and restrictions many companies imposed 
on charitable giving. The program’s idealistic foundations 
helped it carve out a place on corporate ledgers as a business 
expense, without also committing to specific deliverables.
Michigan’s pitch found a receptive audience in industry. 
In December 1951, the National Association of Manufac-
turers’ board of directors ratified a Resolution on Support 
of Educational Institutions, declaring: “Business enterpris-
es must find a way to support the whole educational pro-
gram—effectively, regularly and now.” The chairman of the 
board of General Motors, Alfred P. Sloan, made a similar 
argument in Collier’s that same year. American industry, 
Sloan insisted, had a duty to support American universities 
because: “It is vital—if we are to perpetuate our free soci-
ety—that we find a way to keep our colleges, universities, 
and technological institutions virile, progressive and—above 
all else—free.”14 Sloan’s commentary, which was subtly if 
not explicitly anti-communist, emphasized that extensive 
federal funding would entail excessive political control. 
It rang musically in the ears of Phoenix staff. GM would 
eventually contribute $1.5 million toward Phoenix’s origi-
nal $6.5 million goal and Sloan’s article became required 
reading for Phoenix fundraisers. Through its connections 
to industry, Phoenix benefitted from the looming ideo-
logical conflict with the Soviet Union, which strength-
ened the rhetorical link between industry support for uni-
versity research and the health of American capitalism.
The better proportion of early corporate gifts to Phoenix were 
either unrestricted or directed to a general research fund, in-
cluding those from Dow Chemical, Detroit Edison, General 
Motors, and Eli Lilly. This established a pattern of corporate 
support that continued for decades, cementing the universi-
ty’s newly close relationship with local and national corpo-
rations, especially those in the automotive sector. The most 
visible outcome of this relationship was the Ford Nuclear 
Reactor, a research reactor built with a $1 million grant from 
the Ford Motor Company. The reactor came online in 1957 
and operated until 2003. The process by which Michigan 
courted and acquired corporate support for this and similar 
projects suggests a model of science funding that historians 
have not yet adequately explored. The ideals and ideologies 
at the heart of the Phoenix Project underwrote the program’s 
pitch to industry, and industry’s willingness to go along 
reflects both the optimism and the uncertainty surround-
ing non-military nuclear research in the early Cold War.
Conclusions
Much of the Michigan Memorial–Phoenix Project’s success 
can be attributed to its dual role as a war memorial and a 
nuclear science initiative. Linking those functions spurred 
research that was innovative and interdisciplinary. Phoenix 
straddled the blurry boundary between philanthropy and 
investment. This helped it mobilize alumni, who might not 
have been otherwise compelled to support the University’s 
research activities, and draw greater interest from indus-
trial patrons, who had scant incentive to fund a memori-
al, but who likely made fewer demands for direct payouts 
from their investments because Phoenix doubled as one. 
As a program pursuing peaceful applications of nuclear 
science, the Phoenix Project was subject to the many con-
tradictions of the Cold War. It dedicated itself to peaceful 
research while under a director fresh from coordinating 
bomb tests at Bikini Atoll. Overtures to industry rested on 
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implicitly anti-communist rhetoric about free enterprise. 
At the same time, Phoenix was imbued from the begin-
ning with a youthful optimism borrowed from Michigan’s 
students. As such, it offers of a different perspective on 
civilian nuclear research than the one told from the per-
spective of the Atomic Energy Commission, which, as a 
governmental agency, was much more sensitive to both 
national politics and geopolitical strategy. Eschewing gov-
ernment support prompted Michigan to navigate the 
contradictions of the Cold War in a very different way.
The Phoenix Project outlasted the Cold War, and contin-
ues to operate within the University of Michigan’s Energy 
Institute, where it remains dedicated to nuclear science 
(Figure 6). The early success that made such longevity pos-
sible reflects an aspect of the early nuclear age that has 
received less historical attention than the potent mix of 
power, fear, and secrecy driving government-based nuclear 
programs. The students who proposed the memorial did 
so with a spirit of optimism for the future that captured 
the enthusiasm of their peers, Michigan’s administration, 
and its alumni. Similarly, enlisting industry in a common 
purpose reflected the pervasive, if unfocused sense of pos-
sibility that surrounded nuclear research, despite the anxi-
ety the bomb had precipitated.15 It was, perhaps, inevitable 
that the University of Michigan would establish a nuclear 
research program, raise funds from alumni, and develop 
closer ties with industry after World War II. The particu-
lar way these developments unfolded, however, owes a great 
deal to a handful of students and their invincible surmise.
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Figure 6. The Michigan Memorial–Phoenix Project continues to operate today as a division of the University of Michigan’s Energy Institute. (Photo-
graph by the author).
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